where are we and where should we go from here? by Groth, Markus
The use of markets for biodiversity in Germany: where are we and where should we go 
from here? 1 
 
Markus Groth 
Leuphana University of Lueneburg 
Sustainability Economics Group 
Scharnhorststr. 1 
D-21335 Lueneburg 
Email.: groth@uni-lueneburg.de 
 
Abstract 
Managed grasslands contribute in a number of ways to the biodiversity of European agricultural 
landscapes and provide a wide range of ecosystem services that are also of socio-economic value. 
Against the background of a rapid biodiversity loss in agricultural landscapes, increasing 
attention is being paid to farming practices that enhance ecosystem services. Therefore 
developing cost-effective conservation payment schemes is the main challenge facing present 
European agri-environmental policy. However, there is still a serve shortage of knowledge and 
practical experiences concerning the use of conservation procurement auctions in Europe.  
The aim of the paper, therefore, is twofold. Firstly, the current state of using markets for 
biodiversity by means of payment-by-results biodiversity conservation procurement auctions will 
be discussed by reviewing two field experiments with farmers in two case-study areas in 
Germany. Secondly, further need for research will be discussed briefly.  
Keeping in mind the methodological difficulties of evaluating field experiments, this empirical 
work indicates a potential for budgetary cost advantages of auctioning compared to traditional 
fixed flat-rate payment schemes of up to 52 per cent. These findings along with the relatively 
high number of successful participants indicate that this specific approach will most probably be 
an improvement over current agri-environmental programmes in the EU. This is mainly because 
low-cost producers gain smaller information rents and conservation agencies will be able to close 
contracts with (some) high-cost farmers due to cost-effectiveness gains provided by low-cost 
landowners.  
                                                 
1 Paper accepted for presentation as part of the 2010 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global 
Environmental Change. This draft: 17.08.2010. Section five is based on joint work together with Franziska Dittmer; 
it highlights some first brief ideas from a still unpublished manuscript. 
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Even though the case-studies have yielded promising results, some critical aspects as well as 
lessons to be learnt will be discussed to improve the design and performance of upcoming 
biodiversity conservation procurement auctions based on performance payments. Current need 
for research addressed in the paper takes deals with the design of a specific agri-environment 
index for plant biodiversity.  
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1 Introduction 
The United Nations proclaimed 2010 to be the International Year of Biodiversity. Europe’s 
biodiversity currently faces a rapid loss within agricultural landscapes, which implies a decline of 
various ecosystem services that are of socio-economic value. Against this background, increasing 
attention is to be paid to farming practices that contribute to the maintenance and enhancement of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. Therefore, the development of a cost-effective conservation-
compatible land use policy to influence private land management is the main challenge currently 
facing EU agri-environmental policy. Thereby the protection of ecosystem services as well as the 
preservation of biodiversity plays a central role, both from an economic and ecological 
perspective (Balvanera et al., 2001; Balvanera et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2007; MEA, 2005; Sala 
and Peruelo, 1997; Sukhdev et al., 2008).  
In the EU, agri-environmental programmes are the most important policy instrument to conserve 
biodiversity by providing monetary incentives to farmers by means of compensation payments. 
Since the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992 such voluntary incentive 
schemes have been supported by the EU as part of the second pillar of the CAP. 
However, current action-oriented agri-environmental programmes aimed at conserving 
biodiversity involve a number of potential drawbacks like vaguely defined objectives, a lack of 
monitoring and a poor uptake due to management restrictions (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Kleijn and 
Sutherland, 2003; Kleijn et al., 2006; Whitfield, 2006; Von Haaren and Bathke, 2007). Even if 
the practical implementation of payment-by-results approaches is still limited to few case-studies 
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and programmes, paying landowners based on ecological result instead of compensating them for 
carrying out predetermined management agreements has several potential advantages over the 
current schemes, as follows (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Wittig et al., 2006, Von Haaren and Bathke, 
2007): i) a shift away from rigid requirements and targets for action, ii) a payment solely based 
on actual ecological results, iii) the promotion of self-interest of landowners concerning the 
environmental performance and the ecological capital of their managed grassland sites, iv) the 
inclusion of the farmer’s specific experience and knowledge, v) a higher potential for innovation, 
vi) a reduction of information asymmetries, vii) a better control of the ecological-effectiveness of 
conservation payment schemes, and iix) a higher acceptance of payments as part of agri-
environment programmes.  
The prerequisite for a payment-by-results approach for plant biodiversity is that ecological 
services need to be standardised according to their ecological quality and must meet certain 
conditions and requirements. This implies that ecological services are valuable goods and could 
be detected without complicated methods. Furthermore, the ecological goods should act as an 
indicator and – in addition to their actual usefulness – should imply positive effects on other 
natural resources.  
Within current action-oriented agri-environmental programmes, farmers receive a fixed flat-rate 
payment, based on the estimated average opportunity costs of carrying out predetermined 
management measures. In this context, there are also concerns that the cost-effectiveness of agri-
environmental programmes is often unsatisfying. Low-cost producers gain informational rents 
(overcompensation) and landowners with opportunity costs above the fixed flat-rate payment will 
not participate, due to missing incentives. This is mainly the case since in contractual 
relationships involving payments for environmental services, policy implementing authorities 
know less than each landowner about the costs of contractual compliance. Therefore landowners 
may use their private information to extract informational rents (Wu and Babcock, 1996; Latacz-
Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Cason et al., 2003; Stoneham et al., 2003; Cason and 
Gangadharan, 2004; Groth, 2007; Pascual and Perrings, 2007; Claassen et al., 2008; Ferraro, 
2008). Reducing such informational rents, therefore, is an important task for buyers of 
environmental services who wish to maximize the services obtained from a rather limited budget.  
Hence, conservation agencies should try to pay farmers for the provision of environmental 
services in the most cost-effective way. A promising approach for increasing policy cost-
effectiveness is to strengthen incentive mechanisms and market-creation by the use of 
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conservation procurement auctions. Within such auctions a buyer of environmental services (the 
conservation agency) invites bids from suppliers of environmental services (the landowners) and 
closes contracts with the lowest bid-prices. The potential benefit of this approach is the 
possibility to close conservation contracts based on individual costs of contractual compliance, as 
represented by different bid-prices, and thus, improve policy efficacy. 
The EU Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development 
by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) has already introduced 
auctioning as a new instrument for granting agri-environmental payments and awarding 
conservation contracts. However, there is still a significant shortage of knowledge and practical 
experiences and the evaluation of conservation procurement auctions in Europe is restricted to 
few scientifically supported case-studies or pilot-programmes. Since these case-studies have been 
limited to one region (county) there is also still a lack of clarity whether and how such payment 
schemes could be transferred to other regions. In an effort to portray the advantages of an 
alternative policy-implementation approach, this paper mainly deals with the transferability and 
performance of a payment scheme that combines a payment-by-results approach with the use of 
discriminatory-price conservation procurement auctions for grassland plant biodiversity. 
Furthermore, need for research addressed in the paper deals with the design of a specific agri-
environment index for plant biodiversity in order to improve current payment-by–results 
biodiversity conservation procurement auctions.  
The paper is structured as follows. The second section introduces conservation procurement 
auctions as well as different payment formats and presents the current state of practical 
experiences and cost-effectiveness gains of conservation procurement auctions. Section three 
briefly discusses the original case-study, whereby both the case-study design and the main results 
will be highlighted. Section four discusses the design, transferability and performance of the 
adapted case-study. Thereby the conducted adjustments and the results of the submitted and 
successful bids as well as potential cost-effectiveness gains will be focused. Within the fifth 
section further need for research will be highlighted by discussing suggestions about how an agri-
environment index can be designed by taking into account specific ecological and economical 
factors that reflect benefits and costs of biodiversity conservation. Section six concludes.  
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2 Conservation procurement auctions 
2.1 Payment format and auction design 
Auctions to buy ecological services from landowners focus on budgetary cost-effectiveness and 
the possibility to gather information about the production costs of agricultural firms (Wu and 
Babcock, 1996; Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Cason et al., 2003; Stoneham et 
al., 2003; Cason and Gangadharan, 2004; Naidoo et al., 2006; Claassen et al., 2008; Ferraro, 
2008). Standard selling auctions can be adopted as procurement or reverse auctions, like in the 
case of auctioning ecological services. But auction theory (Klemperer, 2002; Krishna, 2002) does 
not offer clear guidance for biodiversity conservation contract auctions because these specific 
auctions have unusual attributes (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005; Ferraro, 2008). 
A main aspect is that conservation procurement auctions are usually repeated auctions over a 
sequence of time periods. The results are binding for each time period, but there will be future 
opportunities to bid on the same units and bids for the same ecological service on one site are 
invited in a sequence of various bidding rounds instead of a one-shot auction. This allows bidders 
to take into account the results of previous auctions and to adjust their bids (Reichelderfer and 
Boggess, 1988). Also to be mentioned is the number of goods traded. The relevant units are in 
general contracts that specify – for a period of time – a level of environmental services or an 
observable set of land uses that are offered in exchange for a payment. Landowners may be 
allowed to offer single or multiple units, which may be divisible or indivisible, homogenous or 
heterogeneous (Hailu and Thoyer, 2006). Conservation procurement auctions are multi-unit 
procurement auctions and the administration selects various farmers with a number of 
heterogeneous sites to take part in the auction. Furthermore, it needs to be considered that 
conservation auctions can be used either as budget-constraint auctions or as target-constraint 
auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005). The budget-constraint auction is the usual case 
that agri-environmental schemes have a limited budget to spend and bids are accepted until the 
budget is exhausted. Another aspect of designing conservation procurement auctions is the 
question of whether a reserve price should be set. A reserve price is a price limit that defines the 
maximum amount that the administration is willing to accept (Stoneham et al., 2003; Latacz-
Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).  
In order to avoid information rents and collusion, it has to be considered carefully which 
information will be given to bidders. Consequently, only sealed-bid auctions are appropriate and 
there are two basic payment formats to be used within repeated multi-unit conservation 
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procurement auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Stoneham et al., 2003; 
Cason and Gangadharan, 2004; Cason and Gangadharan, 2005; Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 
2005; Ferraro, 2008):  
i. A sealed bid – stating the individual price for a specific ecological service – is submitted 
by each bidder in the uniform-price procurement auction. The good is then bought at a 
price determined by the price of the highest winning bid or the lowest rejected bid. All 
successful bids are paid equal. Thus the individual bid-price determines the probability of 
acceptance, but not the final payment. The optimal bidding strategy, therefore, is to reveal 
the accurate opportunity costs. 
ii. In the discriminatory-price procurement auction, also a sealed bid is submitted for every 
site, but all accepted bids are receiving payments according to the individual bid-price. 
This auction design implies incentives for bidders to bid a price above the individual 
opportunity costs and to ensure themselves information rents, if the bid finally is 
successful.  
 
The theory of budget-constrained auctions suggests that it is optimal for bidders in a 
discriminatory-price procurement auction to overbid relative to their true costs of providing the 
ecological good (Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Cason and Gangadharan, 
2005). The bid curve, therefore, does not represent the true cost curve; it rather contains a rent for 
the bidder. Hence the supply curve is not identical within discriminatory-price procurement 
auctions and uniform-price procurement auctions, whereby the true opportunity costs equal the 
bid-prices within a uniform-price auction. The latter is based on the true marginal cost curve of 
environmental service provision, without a rent element. A discriminatory-price procurement 
auction does thus reveal differences in opportunity costs, but – because of the incentive to 
overbid – only imperfectly so.  
Two other relevant aspects of pricing rules are fairness (Ferraro, 2008). In some cases, paying 
everyone the same price may be considered fairer than discriminating by individual opportunity 
cost (same ecological service, same payment). In other cases, paying everyone the same price 
regardless of their opportunity costs may be considered unfair (and a waste of taxpayer money).  
Facing the practical considerations of a case-study implementation some further aspects need to 
be considered. A main argument against uniform-price conservation procurement auctions is that 
farmers with low opportunity costs would benefit disproportional from a higher payment, because 
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the strike price reflects the required compensation for owners of more productive sites. In 
contrast, a discriminatory-price conservation procurement auction does not pay landholders more 
than what they bid. Furthermore, it is to be expected that bidders will take into account 
information on the uniform payment within repeated uniform-price procurement auctions and 
adjust their bid-prices.  
Auction outcomes are thus sensitive to the bidding rules and the characteristics of the contracts 
and bidders. Whether informational rents are actually higher under a uniform-price payment 
format or under a discriminatory-price payment format is obviously an empirical question and the 
choice between both payment formats is still controversial in practice.  
 
2.2 Practical experiences and cost-effectiveness gains  
Since 1986 the U.S. Department of Agriculture has been awarding land retirement contracts for 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) based on a competitive bidding mechanism. Farmers 
bid to obtain CRP cost share assistance, which is allocated to them based on a so-called 
Environmental Benefit Index (Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988; Babcock et al., 1996; Claassen 
et al., 2008). In Australia, conservation procurement auctions are used for objectives such as 
salinity control, nutrient control and conservation of native vegetation where land use change is 
required to achieve environmental improvement as part of the BushTender trials and other 
projects as part of the Market-based Instruments Pilot Program (Stoneham et al., 2003; Grafton, 
2005; National Market Based Instrument Working Group, 2005). In Europe, a conservation 
scheme combining auctioning and fixed-price payments had been used in two counties in the 
state of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany (Hilden, 2007). Moreover, the Central Scotland Forest 
and Grampian Challenge Fund was based on auctioning to encourage additional afforestation on 
private land (CJC Consulting, 2004). 
Even though very promising from a theoretical perspective and in some cases already approved 
in practice, there is still little evidence about efficiency and cost-effectiveness gains of auctions 
compared to payment schemes using fixed flat-rate payments. Furthermore, reported results on 
cost-effectiveness gains vary greatly. Stoneham et al. (2003) mention that the first auction within 
the BushTender trial had lead to an amount of biodiversity that would have cost up to seven times 
more if a fixed-price payment scheme had been used instead of the auction. A simulation of 
farmers’ bidding behaviour within a hypothetical payment scheme auctioning conservation 
contracts by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) points out efficiency gains from 16 
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to 29 per cent. An evaluation of the Central Scotland Forest and Grampian Challenge Fund for 
the Forestry Commission Scotland by CJC Consulting (2004) reports efficiency gains in the 
range of 33 to 36 per cent. Within the Catchment Care Program as part of the National Market-
based Instruments Pilot Program in Australia, an auction for biodiversity and water quality – ones 
in place – would be expected to be between 23 and 34 per cent more cost-effective than the 
former fixed price scheme (National Market Based Instruments Working Group, 2005). White 
and Burton (2005) were able to use data from the Auction for Landscape Recovery programme to 
benchmark the cost-effectiveness of the auction to an equivalent flat-rate payment scheme. They 
show that the cost-effectiveness gains of the auction vary between 207 per cent and 315 per cent 
in the first auction and 165 per cent and 186 per cent in the second auction, whereby the results 
depend on whether the fixed price scheme is input-based or output-based. A case-study in the 
Northeim region in Germany (the case-study is part of this paper as the original case-study or 
‘Northeim-project’; section 3) shows a potential for cost-effectiveness gains in the range of 21 to 
36 per cent (Groth, 2007; Groth, 2008a). 
 
3 The original case-study (‘Northeim-project’)2 
3.1 Payment scheme and auction design 
The original case-study conservation procurement auctions was carried out as part of a research 
programme to conserve environmental services in agriculture. Within the payment scheme, 
regional-specific environmental goods of plant biodiversity were rewarded as results of 
environmental services of agriculture. These ecological services were defined as ecological goods 
of plant biodiversity (Bertke, 2005), whereby the production of these so-called ecological goods 
‘grassland’ aimed to protect regional endangered plant communities and to promote species-rich 
grassland. The ecological goods and their represented ecological quality were defined by the 
number of different species per control plot (circle with 2m radius = 12.6m²), as follows: 
grassland I: number of species >= 8/12.6m²; grassland II: number of species >= 8/12.6m² + 2 
target species; grassland III: number of species >= 8/12.6m² + 4 target species. For that purpose, 
                                                 
2 Within this paper, the original case-study will only be presented briefly and focussed on main aspects. For a 
detailed discussion of the design and performance of the conservation procurement auctions as part of the case-study, 
see Groth (2007; 2008a). The specific farmers’ private transaction costs for the case-study conservation procurement 
auctions are discussed in Groth (2008b). For a more general discussion of the case-study and results of the on-the-
spot controls, see Klimek et al. (2008). 
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40 species were selected and included in a catalogue of species as part of the bidding documents 
(Bertke, 2005). 
From an economic point of view, the bid-price per hectare was taken into account. The ecological 
evaluation was based on the classifications grassland I, grassland II and grassland III. Thus 
within every category of ecological goods different prices were paid for a homogeneous 
ecological good. 
The specific auction design was a repeated sealed-bid discriminatory-price multi-unit 
conservation procurement auction, with a separate budget-constraint for each quality of 
ecological goods. The regional demarcation corresponded to a uniform exclusion border. To 
safeguard a high number of participants and low possibilities for collusion, all farmers were 
allowed to take part with all their grassland sites located in the case-study area. In both auctions 
the same (potential) cohort of farmers was part of the field experiment.  
Landowners not exactly meeting the ecological requirements of the ecological good the bid 
targeted on were not paid at all. Thereby it was left to the farmers to decide how to achieve the 
desired grassland I, II or III status. The results were assessed by means of on-the-spot controls on 
the grassland sites at the end of the contract period. As part of the on-the-spot controls the 
number and quality of different species were evaluated in control plots, representative for the 
whole grassland site (Klimek et al., 2008) 
Since bidding behaviour is very sensitive to the type and amount of information communicated to 
farmers, no information except the definition of the ecological goods as part of the specification 
of services and the terms to be maintained was given to potential bidders in both auctions. The 
budget was not pre-announced in both auctions and the potential bidders in the second auction 
were not informed about the highest accepted bid-prices. Due to the fact that both auctions were 
part of a research project, an interdisciplinary group of researchers acted as the auctioneer and 
evaluated the bids. The original case-study enfolded two field auctions. The first auction was 
carried out in the time-period 2004/2005 and the second auction in 2006 (Groth, 2007; Groth, 
2008a).  
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3.2 Results – auction performance 
The results of the original case-study will now be presented briefly.3 To participate in the case-
study, landowners were allowed to submit an individual bid for each grassland site, whereas they 
were also allowed to submit several bids for all categories of ecological services. Main results of 
the submitted bids are presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
If we take a look at the wide ranges and standard deviations of individual bid prices within each 
category of ecological goods and both auctions, it becomes clear that the farmers were actually 
confronted with different opportunity cost for the provision of an – in each case – equal quality of 
ecological services. The price level increased – as expected – within both auctions from good 
grassland I about good grassland II up to good grassland III. 
Besides the submitted bids, the paper will now briefly discuss the successful bids presented in 
table 2 for both auctions and all three categories of ecological goods. It needs to be remembered 
that both auctions had been budget-constraint auctions with no reserve price. Due to a budget-
restriction of €30,000 not all bids in the total amount of €33,747.91 could have been accepted 
within the first auction. Finally, 159 sites by 28 farmers – covering an area of 288.56 hectare – 
were taken under contract. With a total bid sum of €51,481.23 the budget-restriction of €26,000 
was also exceeded in the second auction and therefore altogether 164 sites by 21 farmers were 
accepted, whereby 238.46 hectare of species-rich grasslands were covered. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The results clarify a wide range of individual bid-prices and thus the consequences of the 
discriminatory-price payment format for conservation contracting. The price level decreased from 
the first to the second auction both for the ecological goods grassland I and grassland II, mainly 
due to an adjustment by reducing the specific budget-constraint.  
On the other hand, the price level and the highest successful bid-price per hectare for the peak 
quality of biodiversity – represented by the ecological goods grassland III – increased from the 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion, see Groth (2007; 2008a). 
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first to the second auction. This increase was caused by an adjustment of the subdividing of the 
total budget-restriction on the three categories of ecological goods in the second auction.  
Finally the main results of the potential for cost-effectiveness gains by auctioning compared to 
fixed flat-rate payments4 will be introduced for the original case-study (see section 4.2.3 for a 
brief general discussion on methodological questions and restrictions of analysing the potential 
for cost-effectiveness gains in practice). In the first auction 198.25 hectare were taken under 
contract, whereas the specific budget sums up to €16,100.84. To achieve the equivalent area by 
using a fixed flat-rate payment of €103 per hectare a total budget of €20,419.75 would have been 
required. Auctioning has in this case gained savings of €4,318.91 or – in other words – cost-
effectiveness gains of 21.2 per cent. The similar comparison for the second auction approves this 
positive appraisal. By using the fixed flat-rate payment of €103 per hectare, a budget of 
€13,395.15 would have been required to attain the ecological objective of 130.05 hectare 
grassland taken under contract in 2006. This objective was achieved by auctioning with a fee of 
€8,527.30, which equals savings of €4,867.85 (36.3 per cent) (Groth, 2007; Groth, 2008a).  
 
4 The adapted case-study (‘Steinburg-Project’) 
4.1 Payment scheme and auction design 
The adapted case-study also aimed to reward landowners for their voluntary provision of 
regional-specific plant biodiversity of environmental services in a cost-effective way. Therefore 
the number of species was taken into account and a first adjustment was conducted. For this 
purpose the former catalogue of 40 regional-specific species from the original case-study was 
reduced to 32 regional-specific species and tailored to the specific characteristics for regional 
plant communities that are suitable for the case-study area. 
In order to reduce the complexity of the payment scheme and to use a payment-by-results 
definition that equals payment-by-results agri-environmental programmes recently implemented 
in Germany, a second adjustment was implemented by using two and not three quality 
classifications. Thereby the payment-by-results approach was now based on the number of 
different species per segment on a representative transect and not based on different species per 
                                                 
4 Compared to the ‘Lower Saxony agri-environmental programme, measure B: support of extensive grassland use”. 
This support of an extensive use of grassland fits best with the ecological good grassland I, whereas the latter even 
represents a higher ecological quality because the auction rewards an extensive use of grassland sites plus the proof 
of a specific amount of plant biodiversity indicated by eight different species. By the time the case-study took place, 
farmers were paid a flat-rate payment of €103 per hectare within the agri-environmental programme. 
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representative control plots, like in the original case-study. This third adjustment was 
accomplished since the method of using transects has approved to be more practicable and more 
precise (Voß and Jödicke, 2006). Thereby each grassland site was crossed by one transect and 
each transect was divided into three equal segments. Two ecological quality classifications were 
defined, as follows: i) quality I: at least four different forb species within all three segments on 
the transect; ii) quality II: at least six different forb species within all three segments on the 
transect. Hence, this payment-by-results approach based on plant biodiversity shall mainly 
achieve i) the maintenance of grassland on marginal sites, ii) the promotion of regional species-
rich types of grassland and iii) the conservation of rare plant associations.  
Within the adapted case-study, the first auction was carried out in 2007 and the second auction in 
2008. Thereby a fourth adjustment was conducted. Contrary to the original case-study, the 
farmers had not yet to determine whether they bid on the quality classification quality I or quality 
II. The farmers only had to state a price, which they think is adequate if the requirements for 
quality I or quality II will be fulfilled on the specific grassland site. This adjustment mainly 
aimed to reduce farmers’ risk within the payment-by-results approach. Based on the results of on-
the-spot controls, the grassland sites were classified as i) ineligible, ii) quality I or iii) quality II. 
The successful farmers were paid based on the results of the on-the-spot controls and according 
to the individual bid-prices for quality I or quality II. 
The auction design in the adapted case-study was also a budget-constraint sealed-bid 
discriminatory-price conservation procurement auction. All farmers were allowed to take part in 
the field experiment auctions with their grassland sites located in the case-study area (the county 
Steinburg). In both auctions the same (potential) cohort of farmers participated in the field 
experiment. No information except the definition of the ecological quality classifications as part 
of the specification of services (by the use of a brochure with coloured photographs and 
descriptions of indicator species) and the terms to be maintained were given to potential bidders 
in both auctions. The budget was not pre-announced in both auctions and the potential bidders for 
the second auction were not informed about the highest accepted bid-price in the first auction.  
 
4.2 Results – auction performance 
4.2.1 Submitted bids 
All farmers were allowed to submit several bids for both ecological quality classifications. 
Thereby an individual bid had to be submitted for every grassland site. The discussion of the 
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auction results is based on the scale of a grassland site. The number of farmers equals the number 
of bids, whereby each bid contains one or more different grassland sites with different bid-prices. 
The results of the submitted bids are presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 shows a wide range of bid-prices for an – within each quality classification – equal 
amount of floristic plant biodiversity. Against the background of collusion within repeated 
conservation procurement auctions, it is important to point out that the range of bid-prices has not 
changes for quality I and even increased for quality II. Moreover, the standard deviation slightly 
increased for the quality I grassland sites and greatly increased for the high quality grassland 
sites. Thus, within both case-study auctions there is no evidence for collusive bidding behaviour. 
It already becomes clear that the case-study auctions have met one of their main objectives. By 
implementing a market for plant biodiversity by means auf conservation procurement auctions it 
was possible to learn about differences in farmers’ opportunity costs of providing and 
maintaining floristic biodiversity in the case-study area. Hence this information was used to 
reduce the information asymmetry between the conservation agency and the farmers.  
Due to the approach that farmers had not to decide mandatory whether they bid for quality I or 
quality II, there is an inevitably empirical constraint that each grassland site is included both in 
the submitted bids for quality I and quality II. Therefore, it is not possible to draw any further 
meaningful conclusions from the results of the submitted bids within the adapted case-study. 
 
4.2.2 Successful bids 
Besides the discussion of submitted bids, the paper will discuss the successful bids taken under 
contract and rewarded with the given budget. Thereby the compliance to requirements was 
verified by means of on-spot-controls until the end of June. Main results of the successful bids 
are presented in table 4.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Similar to the original case-study, the wide ranges and standard deviations of bid-prices – within 
both auctions and for both ecological quality classifications – point out differences of farmers’ 
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opportunity cost for the provision of floristic species richness on managed grassland sites. Within 
currently used flat-rate payment schemes these differences of opportunity costs would have 
remained unknown to the policy implementing authority while conservation contracting. 
The price level (the mean bid-price) of successful bids for the quality I grassland sites declined 
from the first to the second auction by €6.58 or 10.12 per cent, respectively. For the highest 
quality grassland sites, the price-level (the mean bid-price) slightly increased from the 2007 
auction to the 2008 auction by €3.96 (3.65 per cent). Thereby it would have generally been 
possible to use a reserve price (an internal price limit) to avoid an increase in prices. However, 
due to its small extend, the auction design has not been changed and this increase in prices was 
accepted.  
Due to different sizes of grassland sites and differences in bid-prices, the payments per bid (per 
grasslands site) vary greatly. Compared to the 2007 auction, the mean payment for the quality I 
grassland sites in 2008 decreased by €90.50 (36.39 per cent), mainly because both the price-level 
and the size of the grassland sites decreased. 
In the 2007 auction, €4,475.98 were spent for quality I grassland sites and €3,055.87 for quality II 
ones. Within the second auction, the total payment summed up to €5,694.04 for quality I 
grassland sites (+ 27.21 per cent) and €4,305.89 (+ 40.91 per cent) for quality II. Thereby the 
total area increased from the first to the second auction by 27.12 hectare (39.19 per cent) for 
quality I grassland sites and by 11.08 hectare (37.21 per cent) for quality II grassland sites.  
 
4.2.3 Cost-effectiveness gains 
The paper will now discuss the potential for cost-effectiveness gains by auctioning compared to 
fixed flat-rate payments. For that purpose it is important to remember that the opportunity cost 
curve is the relevant supply curve when a fixed flat-rate payment is offered. All landowners with 
opportunity costs below the fixed payment gain from participation in the payment scheme. The 
marginal participant is the one whose opportunity cost is equal to the payment rate offered. Under 
a discriminatory-price auction, the ordered bid-prices – not the opportunity cost curve – represent 
the supply curve.  
An evaluation of cost-effectiveness gains of auctioning compared to fixed flat-rate payment 
schemes should be done against a supply curve reflecting true marginal costs. An auction does 
reveal differences in opportunity costs, but only imperfectly so. Because of incentive to overbid, 
the true opportunity costs could not be identified within the case-study and remain subject to 
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asymmetric information in any field experiment. An appropriate comparison of the auction 
performance and a flat-rate payment scheme thus is difficult, based on data generated by field 
experiments. A precise comparison requires the use of laboratory experiments where the true 
marginal costs are perfectly controlled for and known to the experimenter. These limitations 
should be considered for the remainder of the section.  
In order to discuss the specific potential for cost-effectiveness gains as part of the case-study, the 
successful bids are compared to a fixed flat-rate payment scheme using an equivalent payment-
by-results approach. Since there is not yet a payment-by-results approach implemented within 
agri-environmental programmes in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein, the Lower Saxony 
and Bremen agri-environmental programme ‘Measure B2: support of species-rich grassland sites 
based on a payment-by-results approach’ (Lower Saxony Ministry of Food, Agriculture, 
Consumer Protection and Rural Development, 2008) and the Lower Saxony programme 
‘Cooperative conservation programme - permanent grassland, payment-by-results’ (Lower 
Saxony Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, 2007) are used as benchmarks. Within 
these (combined) benchmark programmes the same ecological quality classifications are used as 
in the case-study, but in this case they are termed ‘premium I’ and ‘premium II’. Thereby farmers 
receive a fixed flat-rate payment of €110 per hectare for the quality classification premium I (as 
part of ‘Measure B2: support of species-rich grassland sites based on a payment-by-results 
approach’) and of €215 per hectare for premium II (€110 as part of the ‘Measure B2: support of 
species-rich grassland sites based on a payment-by-results approach’ and additionally €105 per 
hectare as part of the ‘Cooperative conservation programme - permanent grassland, payment-by-
results’). 
Thus this comparison is currently – despite all unavoidable empirical inaccuracy mentioned 
above – the most meaningful way to learn about the potential for cost-effectiveness gains in 
practice, based on the available data from field experiment conservation procurement auctions. 
Main results concerning the potential for cost-effectiveness gains by the case-study conservation 
procurement are presented in table 5.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Results of benchmarking the auction performance with the fixed flat-rate payment scheme – by 
comparing the budget spent within the auctions and the budget that would have been required to 
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take the same area of grassland sites under contract by using the fixed flat-rate payment 
(‘required budget B2 (€)’ or ‘required budget B2+Co (€)’, respectively) – point out a potential for 
cost-effectiveness gains for both quality classifications in both auctions.  
Indicatively, within the first auction 69.20 hectare quality I grassland sites were taken under 
contract and rewarded with a fee of €4,475.98. To take the same area under contract by using the 
fixed flat-rate payment of €110 per hectare, a budget of €7,612.00 would have been required. 
Thus, the results point out a potential for cost-effectiveness gains by auctioning of €3,136.02 
(41.2 per cent). For the successful quality II grassland sites, the results from the 2007 auction 
highlight a potential for cost-effectiveness gains of €3,346.83 (52.27 per cent). A potential for 
cost-effectiveness gains of €4,901.16 (46.25 per cent) was obtained for quality I grassland sites in 
the 2008 auction. For quality II grassland sites the potential for cost-effectiveness gains sums up 
to €4.479.01 (50.99 per cent) in the second auction. 
 
5 Need for research – an agri-environment index (AEI) 
5.1 Basic considerations 
Even though current case-studies in Germany have yielded promising results, some critical 
aspects as well as lessons to be learnt should be discussed to improve the design and performance 
of upcoming biodiversity conservation procurement auctions based on performance payments. 
Accordingly, the leading question of this section is how an environmental benefits index can be 
designed to quantify the biodiversity conservation benefits and costs of a given investment option 
within a biodiversity conservation payment scheme.  
In order to specify suggestions for the design of an AEI, the focus will lie on biodiversity 
conservation in grasslands. This specific habitat type is chosen for two main reasons. Grasslands 
are among the most biodiversity rich habitat types in Europe (EC, 2008) and the area of 
grasslands declines steadily (EC, 2008; BfN, 2009). Moreover, the conservation and recreation of 
semi-natural habitats (like grasslands) via the use of government incentives is politically 
intended, like for example by the German ‘National Strategy on Biological Diversity’ (BMU, 
2007).  
Two different environmental indices should be used as role models: the Environmental Benefits 
Index (EBI) as part of the Conservation Reserve Program in the United States (USDA, 2007; 
Claassen et al., 2008; Hajkowicz et al., 2009; USDA, 2009) and the Biodiversity Benefits Index 
(BBI) within the BushTender trial in Australia (Stoneham et al., 2003; Grafton, 2005; National 
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Market Based Instrument Working Group, 2005; DSE, 2008; DSE, 2009). These specific indices 
are chosen, because they are successfully approved in conservation payment schemes in the USA 
and Australia, and can provide relevant information for designing an AEI, although they do not 
particularly concentrate on biodiversity conservation in grassland habitats. Based on experiences 
from the EBI and the BBI, suggestions for the design of an AEI – considering its adoption in a 
payment scheme for biodiversity conservation in grasslands – will be discussed.  
Before analysing which potential individual factors an AEI should contain, some pre-
considerations have to be outlined. In order to design an AEI, it is first of all important upon 
which specific grassland types the payment scheme will concentrate on. Shall all grassland types 
be able to participate in the scheme? Or shall only so far extensively managed grassland types be 
able to participate, as recommended by Kleijn and Sutherland (2003). Further suggestions about 
the design of an AEI will be based on the assumption that species-poor intensive used grassland 
types and sowed grassland as well as miscellaneous pastures will be excluded from participation 
in a payment scheme. In this case it seems useful to determine specific criteria that can identify 
the target grassland types and exclude all other types from participation. 
Former advantages and disadvantages have shown that a hybrid functional form (according to the 
BBI) – whereby several sub-factors are added up to build a main factor and the main factors are 
multiplied to get the benefits score – is practical and recommendable for calculating prospective 
conservation benefits. This approach gives each main benefit factor more weight than in a purely 
additive calculation (like in the EBI), because a poor performance in one main factor can not 
easily be compensated by a strong performance in another main factor. For that reason, the 
suggestion for the design of an AEI will be built upon this hybrid functional form.  
The design of an AEI is dependent on the scheme configuration. Further suggestions about the 
AEI will be made on the basis of a payment scheme configuration using conservation 
procurement auctions with discriminatory payments. 
 
5.2 First brief suggestions for the design of an AEI 
According to the previous experiences, an AEI that can be adopted in a scheme for biodiversity 
conservation in German grasslands with discriminatory payments can be structured as follows. 
The general design of the AEI is suggested to be a benefits-to-costs ratio – conservation benefits 
as numerator and the costs as denominator – according to the BBI: 
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CostFactor
CSFxCFxCMFAEI =
 
 
Conservation Significance Factor (CSF): The CSF can be determined by the respective grassland 
type (ascertained due to a common vegetation classification) and its conservation significance – 
vulnerability degree of quantitative area decline and qualitative habitat alteration – according to 
the German red list of vulnerable habitat types. 
 
Connectivity Factor (CF): The CF can be determined by a connectivity measure, like a buffer 
measure (e.g. similar to the approach of the neighbourhood analysis of Parkes et al. (2003)).  
 
Conservation Management Factor (CMF): The CMF can be determined by a list that contains a 
broad range of management activities that serve for grassland biodiversity conservation. Each 
management activity is assigned a certain number of score points according to how effective this 
measure is estimated for maintaining or enhancing biodiversity conservation in grasslands. 
Additionally the years of former participation in a conservation scheme as well as the years of 
future contract obligations can be accounted in the CMF. 
 
Cost Factor: The cost factor can be determined by taking the respective bid price per hectare 
(€/ha) of each applicant into account. Because there is no size factor in the numeration, an 
absolute measure like the full bid price cannot be used for an evaluation. Therefore a relative 
measure (e.g. costs per hectare) – like in the EBI will be suggested in this context. 
 
Since species-poor intensively used grassland types as well as sowed grassland and 
miscellaneous pastures will be – within this example – excluded from scheme participation the 
payment scheme needs an approach to determine the threshold for participation. For this purpose 
the approach of using a pre-defined index list of flowering plant species to identify extensively 
managed and species-rich grassland should be adopted. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In current European agri-environmental payment programmes, the conservation agency knows 
less than landowners know about the individual costs of contractual compliance. Hence, 
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landowners may use their private information to extract informational rents. Reducing 
informational rents, therefore, is an important task for buyers of environmental services who wish 
to maximize the services obtained from a limited budget. As authorities designing and 
implementing agri-environmental policy measures in the EU look for better ways of contracting 
landowners for the provisions of ecological services, some rather useful conclusions emerge from 
this case-study on conservation procurement auctions and a payment-by-results approach. First of 
all, it becomes clear that it was possible to transfer the original case-study payment scheme 
successfully to another region, whereby four adjustments were conducted (see section 4.1). 
The results of both auctions within this adapted case-study point out much differentiated bid-
prices and the fact that all main objectives of auctioning (budgetary cost-effectiveness and the 
possibility to gather information about the production costs of agricultural firms) were fulfilled. 
Even if the auctioning scheme is a comparatively simple case-study, results are sufficient to point 
out a potential for cost-effectiveness gains by auctioning compared to traditional fixed flat-rate 
payments in environmental and biodiversity conservation policy. Keeping in mind the 
methodological difficulties of evaluating field experiments, this empirical work indicates 
budgetary-cost advantages of auctioning in comparison to fixed flat-rate payment schemes in the 
range of 41 to 50 per cent. Hence, the adapted case-study even outperforms the original case-
study.  
These findings as well as a relative high number of participants point out that this specific 
approach also became popular with landowner in another German region and that the topic of 
biodiversity conservation turned from a primary complex and somewhat diffuse idea to practical 
actions and monetary incentives for farmers. 
As already mentioned, the reported results of cost-effectiveness gains by auctioning compared to 
flat-rate payments vary greatly. However, the results of this adapted case-study are in line with 
cost-effectiveness gains reported for the Central Scotland Forest and Grampian Challenge Fund 
(CJC Consulting, 2004), the Catchment Care Program in Australia (National Market Based 
Instruments Working Group, 2005) and the original German case-study (Groth, 2007; Groth, 
2008a).  
Even if conservation procurement auctions are an imperfect revelation mechanism, it will most 
probably be an improvement over current flat-rate payments, because low-cost producers gain 
smaller information rents and the conservation agency will – with the same given budget – be 
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able to close contracts with (some) high-cost farmers due to cost-effectiveness gains provided by 
low-cost landowners. 
Despite the potential of combining a payment-by-results approach for floristic biodiversity and 
the use of conservation procurement auctions, it needs to be considered that the implementation 
of conservation auctions into European agri-environmental programmes is – at present – not in 
sight. This lack of political enforceability is particularly caused by the fact that implementing and 
running conservation auctions in practice is far from being trivial and more empirical and 
evaluative work is needed in this area.  
Even though the case-studies have yielded promising results, some critical aspects as well as 
lessons to be learnt should be discussed to improve the design and performance of upcoming 
biodiversity conservation procurement auctions based on performance payments. This is mainly 
the case, since current case-studies used have been characterized by a simple bid-valuation 
without using something like an AEI. Mainly based on experiences from the Environmental 
Benefits Index and the Biodiversity Benefits Index, the recommended design of an AEI is as 
follows. The general structure should be a benefits-to-costs ratio with a quantification of the 
prospective benefits of a grassland site for biodiversity conservation in the numerator and a cost 
factor in the denominator. The evaluation of the benefits contains three factors: the Conservation 
Significance Factor (CSF), the Connectivity Factor (CF) and the Conservation Management 
Factor (CMF). The Cost Factor can be determined by taking the respective bid price per hectare 
(€/ha) that the applicant will demand as compensation payment for the conservation services. 
There should be no doubt, that it is important to change the current practice of payment schemes 
for biodiversity conservation and to implement schemes that effectively induce incentives to 
maintain grassland sites that are of high conservation significance. An AEI seems to be a 
convenient instrument to identify applicants who can provide biodiversity conservation on high-
quality grassland habitats at low costs and thus to allocate limited public funds in a cost-effective 
way. The here given first brief suggestions concerning the design of an AEI may be a 
contribution to further interdisciplinary discussion. 
Therefore, I would also like to encourage the implementation of further inter- and 
transdisciplinary case-studies, bringing together scientists and those actors who are actually 
familiar in practice with designing and receiving payments for environmental services. I strongly 
believe that we should talk more about real changes in the institutions governing the way 
landowners are paid in order to develop a cost-effective and sustainable future European agri-
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environmental policy. Fewer regulations and more – well considered – market creation by a 
combined use of conservation procurement auctions and a payment-by-results approach would 
seem to be a substantial step in the right direction.  
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Table 1. Submitted bids within both auctions – main results 
 1st auction (2004/2005) 2nd auction (2006) 
Grassland I  
- Range of prices in €/ha 40 – 250 (Ø 100.92; ± 47.18) 25 – 160 (Ø  93.94; ± 29.47)
- Number of sites 130 216 
- Hectare 221.16 340.65 
- Number of farmers 27 26 
Grassland II  
- Range of prices in €/ha 55 – 300 (Ø 141.75; ± 59.55) 75 – 300 (Ø 147.67; ± 46.92)
- Number of sites 32 56 
- Hectare 53.33 82.58 
- Number of farmers 16 18 
Grassland III  
- Range of prices in €/ha 100 – 350 (Ø 202.78; ± 78.73) 150 – 450 (Ø 257.35; ± 89.34)
- Number of sites 18 23 
- Hectare 36.98 31.61 
- Number of farmers 8 7 
 Source: Groth, 2008a, p. 9. Ø = mean; ± = standard deviation. 
 
 
Table 2. Submitted bids within both auctions – main results 
 1st auction (2004/2005) 2nd auction (2006) 
Grassland I  
- Range of prices in €/ha 40 – 145 (Ø  84.59; ± 26.45) 25 – 90 (Ø  66.86; ± 15.56)
- Number of sites 109 89 
- Hectare 198.25 130.05 
- Number of farmers 20 10 
Grassland II  
- Range of prices in €/ha 55 – 300 (Ø 141.75; ± 59.55) 75 – 200 (Ø 137.87; ± 30.92)
- Number of sites 32 52 
- Hectare 53.33 76.80 
- Number of farmers 16 17 
Grassland III  
- Range of prices in €/ha 100 – 350 (Ø 202.78; ± 78.73) 150 – 450 (Ø 257.35; ± 89.34)
- Number of sites 18 23 
- Hectare 36.98 31.61 
- Number of farmers 8 7 
 Source: Groth, 2008a, p. 11. Ø = mean; ± = standard deviation. 
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Table 3: Submitted bids within both auctions – main results 
 Auction 2007 Auction 2008 
Quality I   
- Range of bid prices (€/ha)   30 – 150 (Ø 64,94 ± 22,43)   30 – 150 (Ø 67,71 ± 25,18) 
- Payments (€)  19  18 
- Number of farmers 66 62 
- Number of sites 0,25 – 11,56 (Ø 3,29 ± 1,97) 0,17 – 6,49 (Ø 2,76 ± 1,47) 
- Total area (ha) 217,09 171,08 
Quality II    
- Range of bid prices (€/ha)   50 – 160 (Ø 90,41 ± 32,97)   60 – 250 (Ø 113,17 ± 51,39) 
- Payments (€) 18 17 
- Number of farmers 64 59 
- Number of sites 0,25 – 11,56 (Ø 3,36 ± 1,96) 0,17 – 6,49 (Ø 2,69 ± 1,46) 
- Total area (ha) 214,92 158,76 
Source: own. Ø = mean; ± = standard deviation. 
 
 
Table 4: Successful bids within both auctions – main results 
 Auction 2007 Auction 2008 
Quality I   
- Range of bid prices (€/ha)   30 – 100 (Ø 65,00 ± 21,49)   30 – 80 (Ø  58,42 ± 13,62) 
- Payments (€) 101,40 – 708,60 (Ø 248,67 ± 174,32) 10,45 – 439,33 (Ø 158,17 ± 108,48) 
- Number of farmers   9 14 
- Number of sites 18 36 
- Total area (ha) 69,20 96,32 
Quality II   
- Range of bid prices (€/ha)   50 – 160 (Ø  108,64 ± 45,61)   60 – 250 (Ø 112,60 ± 58,39) 
- Payments (€) 87,33 – 485,18 (Ø 277,81 ± 132,58) 86,85 – 540,42 (Ø 287,06 ± 147,90) 
- Number of farmers   9 11 
- Number of sites 11 15 
- Total area (ha) 29,78 40,86 
Source: own. Ø = mean; ± = standard deviation. 
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Table 5: Potential for cost-effectiveness gains within both case-study auctions 
 Auction 2007 Auction 2008 
Quality I   
- Range of bid prices (€/ha) 30 – 100 (Ø 65,00 ± 21,49) 30 – 80 (Ø  58,42 ± 13,62) 
- Flat-rate payment B2 (€/ha) 110 110 
- Total area (ha) 69,20 96,32 
- Sum of payments (€) 4.475,98 5.694,04 
- Required budget B2 (€) 7.612,00 10.595,20 
- Cost-effectiveness gains (€ | %) 3.136,02 | 41,20 4.901,16 | 46,25 
Quality II   
- Range of bid prices (€/ha) 50 – 160 (Ø  108,64 ± 45,61) 60 – 250 (Ø 112,60 ± 58,39) 
- Flat-rate payment B2+Co (€/ha) 215 215 
- Total area (ha) 29,78 40,86 
- Sum of payments (€) 3.055,87 4.305,89 
- Required budget B2+Co (€) 6.402,70 8.784,90 
- Cost-effectiveness gains (€ | %) 3.346,83 | 52,27 4.479,01 | 50,99 
Source: own. Ø = mean; ± = standard deviation. 
 
